Party Savior?
While McCain's willingness to seek support outside the Republican Party -both in electoral and legislative settings -has irritated many within the GOP, he arguably can claim a role in helping to save the party's House majority. Following the end of his own presidential effort last March, McCain campaigned for dozens of Republican congressional candidates, including all eight that ultimately captured Democratic seats. For much of the nation's history, the position was left vacant if a sitting vice president died or resigned. Variously, the president pro tempore of the Senate, the secretary of state, and the speaker of the House were next in line.
But in wake of the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963, the 25th Amendment was passed, which called on the president to nominate a new vice president, who would take office upon confirmation by majority vote of each chamber of Congress.
The amendment has been employed twice, both times during the "time of troubles" in 1973-74 when the nation labored in the shadow of Watergate. Republicans held the White House then, but were a distinct minority at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue -holding less than 45% of the seats in the House and Senate. Yet in both cases, the Democratic Congress gave the GOP president the benefit of the doubt and overwhelmingly approved his choice for vice president.
Still, each selection played out differently. In the fall of 1973, when Spiro T. Agnew abruptly resigned the vice presidency under an ethical cloud, Nixon did not have much room to maneuver in replacing him. Already enmeshed in Watergate and with his own political future in doubt, Nixon's choice of a new vice president was being widely viewed by Democrats and Republicans alike as the next president.
Nixon made a "safe" choice in Gerald R. Ford, the affable House minority leader who was popular among congressional Democrats and Republicans alike. Ford's life was vetted in detail, from his personal finances to his leadership ability. But his confirmation process went rather quicklyless than two months -and in the end, opposition was largely restricted to a cluster of liberal Democrats, who objected to Ford's record on civil rights and his sensitivity to the poor. Ford was confirmed by the Senate on Nov. 27, 1973 , by a vote of 92-3 and by the House on Dec. 6, 1973 , by a vote of 387-35. Probably the most conspicuous "no" vote was cast by Peter W. Rodino Jr. of New Jersey, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. No Republican in either chamber opposed Ford.
The vice presidency came open again less than a year later when Ford became president upon Nixon's resignation. Rather than choose a congressional insider, Ford nominated a longstanding player on the national political stage, former New York Gov. Nelson A. Rockefeller. It proved to be a controversial choice, even within the GOP. Rockefeller's liberal brand of politics had given definition to a whole wing of the Republican Party and his presidential ambitions were assumed by many to still be alive. As well, his considerable wealth, and use of it, raised eyebrows among many members of Congress.
Nominated by Ford in August 1974 on the eve of the fall congressional campaign, Rockefeller's confirmation process dragged out over four months. And the level of opposition, especially in the House, was much higher than it had been for Ford. Nearly one-third of the House voted against Rockefeller's confirmation Dec. 19 . Nine days earlier, he had been approved by the Senate by a vote of 90-7.
Rockefeller drew an eclectic collection of opponents that spanned both parties. In the Senate, it included liberal Democrats such as Birch Bayh and Howard Metzenbaum, and conservative Republicans such as Jesse Helms and Barry Goldwater, who had bitterly opposed Rockefeller for the party's presidential nomination 10 years earlier. To be sure, the congressional district method would not always favor the Republican candidate. When elections are one-sided (such as George H.W. Bush's victory over Michael S. Dukakis in 1988), it tends to narrow the gap between winner and loser. But in a close election, the district-based approach does tend to benefit the GOP. Why? Simply put, Democratic strength is disproportionately concentrated in a comparatively small number of urban districts, while the Republican vote tends to be spread out.
Replacing the Vice President Under the 25th Amendment
Take the battleground state of Illinois as an example. In last November's election, Gore swept the state by 570,000 votes, a convincing margin. But Gore won in only 11 of the state's 20 congressional districts. Gore carried the three majority-black districts anchored in Chicago (the 1st, 2nd and 7th) by margins ranging from 145,000 to 170,000 votes -giving Gore a 480,000-vote advantage in those three districts. While Bush won nine Illinois districts, he failed to carry any by more than 40,000 votes.
Under the winner-take-all system, Gore won all 22 of Illinois's electoral votes. Under the district plan, he would have won 13.
In 1960, the winner-takes-the-state system turned John F. Kennedy's 118,574-vote edge in the nationwide popular vote into a comfortable 303-to-219 triumph in the electoral college. Kennedy Would candidates visit more places? Or would they visit fewer, and concentrate on using television to reach as many voters in as many places as possible?
And when it comes to tallying the vote, would the district plan lead to a scattered array of "mini Floridas"? It might. According to Bensen, the margin of "victory" for Bush or Gore was 1 percent or less in 13 congressional districts last November.
More "What ifs" to keep us occupied until the next election.
Author's Note
O ne of the main goals of this publication is to be as absolutely accurate as possible in the use of facts and numbers, although the end result, at best, often turns out like Ivory Soap -"99.44% pure."
In the March issue, the first name of the new Interior secretary, Ms. Norton, was spelled two different ways: correctly as "Gale" on page 14, but incorrectly as "Gail" in a footnote on the bottom of page 15.
Also, on page 12, Al Gore's margin of victory in Detroit was listed as 219,436 votes, which was based on telephonic communication with the city's election board. Later -and as it turns out, more official -numbers from the Wayne County election board showed Gore's margin in Detroit to be 266,423 votes. Since the point of the piece was to show the importance of urban centers to Gore victories in major battleground states, the updated figure does make the case even stronger, although publication of the original number is nonetheless regretted.
The Actual Tally vs. the District Plan, 1960-2000
G eorge W. Bush would have won a more decisive electoral vote victory last year if the congressional district plan employed in Maine and Nebraska had been used nationwide, his total increasing from the 271 he actually netted to 288. Still, the shift of 17 electoral votes to the Republican nominee would have represented the smallest disparity between the district plan and the actual tally in any presidential contest since 1968.
Those numbers are apparent in the chart below. What is not apparent is that on a state-by-state and region-by-region basis, application of the district plan in 2000 would have produced some very notable differences from the actual tally. (See chart on next page.)
Democrat Al Gore, who was shut out in his native South, would have won 37 electoral votes there using the district plan (which awards a candidate one vote for winning a congressional district and two votes for winning a state). But Bush would have gained at least 15 electoral votes in every other region.
The biggest shifts would have come in some of the largest states. California, which gave Gore all 54 of its electoral votes last fall, would have given Bush 19 under the district plan. On the other hand, Gore would have picked up 10 electoral votes each in two big states that went for Bush, Texas and Florida. Altogether, roughly two-thirds of the states would have had a split result under the district plan rather than the winner-take-all outcomes that are a feature of the present system. 
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: IF THE VOTING WAS BY DISTRICTS

Shifting Congressional Strength
More Than Meets The Eye T ake a look at the House of Representatives from decade to decade, and the movement of seats from the Frost Belt to the Sun Belt appears almost glacier-like. But stand back and look at the shift from the perspective of a half century, and the change is dramatic.
At mid-century, roughly 60% of all House seats were in the Frost Belt states of the Northeast and Midwest. In next year's elections, 55% of the seats will be in the Sun Belt states of the South and West. And even these numbers understate a bit the declining strength of these Frost Belt behemoths, since many of them had reached their peak in congressional T he next chapter in the evolution of the American political landscape will not be written until the election of 2002, but there are a handful of races this year that could act as a telling introduction.
Post-Census Apportionment
Republican-held governorships are at stake in two states this fall, New Jersey and Virginia. Their outcomes could prove a harbinger of the nationwide gubernatorial contests of 2002, when the GOP's advantage over the Democrats (currently 29-to-19, with two independents) will be seriously tested.
Meanwhile, three open House seats will be filled by special elections in the next few weeks. Even a shift of just one seat from one party to the other could make a significant difference in a House where the balance currently stands 220 Republicans, 210 Democrats, and two independents. 
